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The main features incorporated in the Schemes of Arrangement (SOA) in
Malaysia under the Companies Act 2016 were designed over more than a
century ago. For the first time, the company law framework has embraced
corporate rescue laws with the introduction of two tailor-made corporate
rescue mechanisms, Corporate Voluntary Arrangement and Judicial
Management. This paper argues that the SOA, notwithstanding the presence
of the corporate rescue mechanisms, may still be employed to achieve the
objective of advancing corporate rescue for financially distressed private
companies in Malaysia.
1. Introduction
In Malaysia, the corporate insolvency framework is governed by the Companies
Act 2016 (CA 2016) which repealed the Companies Act 1965 (CA 1965) on 31
January 2017. For the first time, the framework embedded two novel corporate
rescue mechanisms, Corporate Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) and Judicial
Management (JM) in line with the world trend in promoting corporate rescue of
financially distressed companies.
Previously under the CA 1965, the lack of corporate rescue mechanisms
had witnessed a heavy reliance on the SOA for the restructuring of public
listed companies especially during the 1997/1998 economic crisis.1 This is
despite the general observation that the purpose of a SOA is not meant specif-
ically as a corporate rescue mechanism.2 A SOA may also be used by a finan-
cially healthy company which includes a reorganisation of its share capital or a
merger of a group of companies or reconstruction of a company involving a
cancellation of its shares coupled with issuance of new shares of different
Corresponding author: Email: thimwchen@yahoo.com
1Ruzita Azmi and Adilah Abd Razak, ‘Schemes of Arrangement as Corporate Rescue
Mechanisms: The Malaysia Experience’, (2015) 41(4) Commonw Law Bull 619, 621.
2Aishah Bidin, ‘Corporate Law Reform and Corporate Governance in Malaysia –
Responses to Globalization’ in P M Vasudev and Susan Watson (eds), Corporate
Governance After the Financial Crisis (Edward Elgar, 2012) 236.
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classes.3 The main features of the SOA under the CA 2016 are either identical
or similar to those in the CA 1965 which itself were adopted from the UK statute as
first appeared in the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement Act 1870 (JSCAA 1870).
Since the main features of the SOA in both Acts are identical or similar, the exten-
sive case laws under the CA 1965 are still relevant for the SOA under the CA 2016.
The Company Law Reform Committee (CLRC), in its report, Consultative
Document on Reviewing the Corporate Insolvency Regime – The Proposal for a
Corporate Rehabilitation Framework [No. 10] (CD No. 10),4 in recommending
the corporate rescue mechanisms to be introduced into the insolvency law frame-
work, observed that the SOA was used by financially distressed public companies
as a rescue mechanism.5 Hence, the SOA was unsuitable for private companies
for rescue purposes which is in line with the observations made in the report of
the Cork Committee.6 However, this paper argues that notwithstanding the pres-
ence of two tailor-made corporate rescue mechanisms, the SOA, despite having
adopted many of its features designed over a century ago, may still be of use for
financially distressed private companies in the new corporate rescue era in
Malaysia. The type of SOA examined in this paper is also known as a creditors’
SOA.7 The other type of SOA is broadly known as a members’ SOA.8
2. Historical features of the SOA
The provisions of the SOA were introduced into the company laws of Malaysia
by the CA 1965.9 The CA 1965 was modelled on the Australian Uniform
Companies Act 1961 (AUCA 1961) which was itself based on the UK Companies
Act 1948 (UKCA 1948).10 An important difference between the CA 1965 or
AUCA 1961 and the UKCA 1948 is the absence of a moratorium provision in the
latter, which has been noted as a shortcoming.11 The moratorium provision known
3Bahrin Kamarul, ‘Insolvency Law in Malaysia’ in Roman Tomasic (ed), Insolvency
Law in East Asia (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006) 338.
4A Consultative Document on Reviewing the Corporate Insolvency Regime – The
Proposal for a Corporate Rehabilitation Framework [No. 10] (2007). <https://www.ssm.
com.my/files/clrc/consultation_documents/cd10.pdf> accessed 11 January 2018.
5Ibid, 63. See also Azmi and Abd Razak (n 1) 621, 646.
6Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982)
(Cork Report), 101 [422].
7See Re Kai Peng (2007) 8 MLJ 122, 128 [10]; Metroplex Bhd & Ors v Morgan
Stanley Emerging Markets Inc & Ors (2005) 6 MLJ 487, 495 [10]. In Jennifer Payne,
Schemes of Arrangement – Theory, Structure and Operation (Cambridge University
Press, 2014) 13, creditors’ SOA is described as schemes employed to restructure the
debts of a financially distressed company.
8See Payne (n 7) 13, where a member SOA is described as schemes employed as an
alternative to a takeover offer for the controlling shares of a target company by
effecting a change of control over the target company.
9Sections 176 to 180.
10Janine Pascoe, ‘Corporate Law Reform and Some ‘Rule of Law’ Issues in Malaysia’,
(2008) 38(3) Hong Kong Law J 769, 769. See also Indo Malaysia Engineering Co Bhd
v Muniandy Rengasamy & Co (1990) 3 MLJ 301, 305.
11Payne (n 7) 354–356, where it was noted that the recommended reforms to the UK
SOA called for the introduction of a moratorium.
538 T. W. Chen et al.
as the restraining order (RO) in both the CA 1965,12 and the Singapore
Companies Act (SCA) was adopted from the AUCA 1961.13 Apart from this dif-
ference, the Australian and the Malaysian statutes are significantly similar to the
provisions in the UK statutes which are responsible for introducing the SOA.14
However, as most of the provisions in both the CA 1965 and the AUCA 1961
were derived from the UK statute, the historical features of the SOA in Malaysia
must involve a study of the evolution of the SOA process in the UK.15
In the UK, the SOA originated from the JSCAA 1870, in particular section
2.16 It was enacted to overcome certain deficiencies in the previous statute, the
Companies Act 1862 (UKCA 1862).17 While the UKCA 1862 in section 136 had
provided for an arrangement or compromise to be made between a company and
its creditors, it was only available to the management of the company if it was in
the process of being wound up voluntarily.18 That arrangement or compromise
was binding on the company only with the approval of 75% of all members and
binding on its creditors if sanctioned by 75% of their number and in value of their
claims.19 In this instance, a court order was not necessary as section 160 of the
Act empowered a liquidator to make the arrangement or compromise with the
consenting creditors.20 On the other hand, in the case of a company being compul-
sorily wound up, similar arrangement or compromise with its creditors and mem-
bers may be made by a liquidator subject to the sanction of the court pursuant to
12See section 176(10) of the CA 1965 which is replicated as section 368 of the
CA 2016.
13Richard J. Hay, ‘Saving Companies in Difficulties-Alternatives to Liquidation’,
(1986) 2 MLJ clv, clx. See also Re Kuala Lumpur Industries Bhd (1990) 2 MLJ 180,
181 where it was also noted that the moratorium provisions do not exist in the UK but
such provisions exist in the Australian statute. In the Australian case of Playcorp Pty
Ltd v Venture Stores (Retailers) Pty Ltd (1992) 10 ACLC 548, the court observed that
the provisions on stay of proceedings had earlier appeared in section 90(6) of the
Companies Act 1958, provisions of which were reproduced and are similar to the RO
in the CA 1965.
14Payne (n 7) 327, noted that the creditor schemes under the UK Joint Stock
Companies Arrangement Act 1870 was first introduced into the New South Wales Act
1899 and the member SOA was introduced into the Australian Companies Act 1936.
See also Re Theatre Freeholds Ltd and Others (1996) 20 ACSR 729, 733-734 for a
historical development of the law on SOA in Australia and its adoption from the
UK statutes.
15Mohamad Illiayas, ‘Schemes of Arrangement under s176 of the Companies Act 1965:
The Criticalness of Correct Classification of Creditors and the Lot of Providers of
Islamic Credit’, (1999) 1 MLJ xlvii, xlix, where section 2 of the UK Joint Stock
Companies Arrangement Act 1870 is observed as the forerunner of the SOA in the
CA 1965.
16Paul L. Davies and Sarah Worthington. Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law
(10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2016) 1005. Section 2 of the JSCAA 1870 was described
as a ‘rudimentary ancestor’ of the SOA provisions in the UK Companies Act 2006 in
Payne (n 7) 7. For a similar observation by the judiciary, see In re T & N Ltd and
others (2006) 1 WLR 1728, 1745–1746.
17Payne (n 7) 7.
18Ibid.
19Ibid. The term, member, is used interchangeably with the term, shareholder, see Soh
Jiun Jen v Advance Colour Laboratory Sdn Bhd & Ors (2010) 5 MLJ 342, 350.
20Ibid.
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section 159 of the Act.21 However in both cases, the court lacked the power to
bind dissenting creditors.22
That significant deficiency in the UKCA 1862 was remedied by providing in
section 2 of the JSCAA 1870 that an arrangement or compromise between a com-
pany and its creditors is made where a majority of the creditors in number with a
75 per cent majority in value, have either present in person or by proxy in a meeting
approved in its favour, which is then sanctioned by the court.23 The binding effect
of the majority creditors on the minority in the JSCAA 1870 was recognised in a
few judicial observations, one of which was made not long after the Act was passed
in an 1871 case, In re Albert Life Assurance Company, and Other Companies:24
The 159th and 160th sections seem to me to provide that a company by its official
liquidators, with the sanction of the Court, is to have exactly the same power of
compromising both with its creditors and its debtors as an individual would
have… … There is nothing in the Act which enables one creditor to bind another
creditor to accept a compromise, or which enables one debtor to bind another
debtor with respect to paying a composition. And that was the difficulty which
was felt when the Act of last session, the Joint Stock Companies Arrangement
Act, 1870, was passed, which I cannot help thinking was passed with a view to
this and other companies which were being wound up. That Act says that there
shall be a power in the majority to bind the minority.
In addition, it was observed in Re Dominion of Canada Freehold Estate and
Timber Company Limited,25 that the JSCAA 1870 was enacted to prevent any sin-
gle person from obstructing a scheme in order to gain a personal advantage by hold-
ing it to ransom notwithstanding that the scheme was beneficial to the majority.
The significance of the JSCAA 1870 as a forerunner of the present SOA is
best underlined by reference to the title of the Act and its section 2. The long title
of the Act read: ‘An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between
creditors and shareholders of Joint Stock and other Companies in liquidation’.26
Its section 2 provided that:27
Where any compromise or arrangement shall be proposed between a company
which is, at the time of the passing of this Act or afterwards, in the course of
being wound up, either voluntarily or by or under the supervision of the Court,
under the Companies Acts, 1862 and 1867, or either of them, and the creditors
of such company, or any class of such creditors, it shall be lawful for the Court,
in addition to any other of its powers, on the application in a summary way of
any creditor or the liquidator, to order that a meeting of such creditors or class
of creditors shall be summoned in such manner as the Court shall direct, and if




24(1871) LR 6 Ch App 381, 386. See also Nicholl v The Eberhardt Company Limited,
(1889) 59 LT 860, 862–863.
25(1886) 55 LT 347, 351.
26See In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Company,
(1891) 1 Ch 213, 227, where the title of the JSCAA 1870 was reproduced.
27Ibid, where section 2 of the JSCAA 1870 was reproduced.
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class of creditors present either in person or by proxy at such meeting shall
agree to any arrangement or compromise, such arrangement or compromise
shall, if sanctioned by an order of the Court, be binding on all such creditors or
class of creditors, as the case may be, and also on the liquidator and
contributories of the said company.
The next major changes made to the law on SOA in the JSCAA 1870 would
bring with it recognisable features of the SOA in the CA 1965. First, by section 24 of
the Companies Act 1900 the operation of the SOA was extended to members.
Section 38 of the Companies Act 1907 then provided that the SOA is also available
to companies which was not in the process of being wound up. Other amendments
were made by section 53 of the Companies Act 1928 which enabled the creditors’
and members’ approval threshold to be lowered by requiring only those creditors or
members ‘present and voting either in person or by proxy’ to be reckoned in the
meeting – by introducing the words, ‘and voting’ into the earlier phrase, abstention
no longer count as a vote against the scheme. Lastly, by section 40 of the Companies
Act 1947, it was required that an explanatory statement must be provided.28
Having incorporated those features, the much changed SOA after the JSCAA
1870 was enacted, was extended as a mechanism to both solvent and insolvent
companies for corporate restructuring and amalgamations.29 Those amended fea-
tures are also part of the Australian legislation on the SOA,30 which were adopted
in Malaysia in the CA 1965 and are replicated in the CA 2016.
3. Theoretical underpinning of SOA in Malaysia
Theories on insolvency law have been developed in the US and more recently in
the UK.31 The early theories, creditors’ bargain and creditor wealth maximization,
have emphasized on maximization of wealth of creditors in disregard to the interests
of other stakeholders. It was followed by the multiple values theory with the belief
that insolvency law has a role to play in rehabilitating companies. In the absence of
any rehabilitation measures, the company would fail, resulting in the loss of jobs
and impairment to the community’s economic well-being.32
28Rebecca Langley, ‘The future role of creditors’ schemes of arrangement in Australia
after the rise of voluntary administrations’, (2009) 27 C&SLJ 70, 72. See also Payne (n
7) 8–10. For similar judicial observations on the series of changes to the Act regarding
the SOA, see In re Schweppes, Limited (1914) 1 Ch 322, 328; In re Guardian
Assurance Company (1917) 1 Ch 431, 440.
29Ibid, where it was noted that the definition of arrangement in the UK Companies Act
1928 and Companies Act 1929 was extended to include reorganisation of share capital
and thus to allow for reconstruction or amalgamation.
30Ibid. See also Colin Anderson, ‘Finding the Background of Part 5.3A of the
Corporations Law’, (1999) 10 Austr J Corp Law 107.
31Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Using theory to study law: a company law perspective’ (1999)
58(1) Camb Law J 197, 197, 216.
32Douglas G Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale Law J 573,
576–577. See also Donald R Korobkin, ‘Contractarianism and the Normative
Foundations of Bankruptcy Law’ (1993) 71 Texas Law Rev 541, 554.
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The SOA is not regarded as a mechanism exclusively designed for corporate
rescue since it can also be used for solvent companies.33 But the SOA with its flexi-
bility, in the absence of corporate rescue mechanisms, has been used for rehabilita-
tion of financially distressed companies. Viewed in this context, the SOA may be
regarded as an alternative tool to the tailor-made corporate rescue mechanisms. In a
nutshell, the SOA between a distressed company and its creditors would involve an
element of ‘give and take’ to enable a creditor to receive something in return for his
debt to be compromised. The SOA in the UK operates without any moratorium but
in Malaysia the restraining order available to its SOA, is akin to a moratorium even
though it is granted at the discretion of the court. In this respect, the SOA with its
restraining order is consistent with the bankruptcy theory that a restructuring can
only be implemented if the creditors are first prevented from initiating proceedings
against the distressed company and its assets.34
In the SOA, it is incumbent on the company to secure the approval of its cred-
itors where a requisite majority is able to bind the dissentients. However, the
approval must be obtained in each class of creditors with similar rights. Under
English law, the counterfactual approach is adopted. This approach involves the
court in evaluating whether the interests of the creditors with restructuring are
worse off as against the position of non-restructuring.35 Notwithstanding the need
to classify creditors, on the whole, the maximization of wealth of creditors is at
the core of the SOA process.
4. The SOA in Malaysia
The main features of the SOA under the CA 2016 are replicated from the SOA
version under the CA 1965.36 The framework of the SOA under the CA 2016
similar to that for the CA 1965 remains ‘barebone’,37 and its operation is depend-
ent on the intensive involvement of the court. Thus, cases decided under the CA
1965 are applicable to the SOA under the present framework. Despite the replica-
tion, some material changes were made to the present SOA. Thus, the SOA under
both Acts are analysed as to its similarities and differences.
4.1. The SOA under the CA 1965
4.1.1. Features of a SOA
The main provision on the SOA in the CA 1965 is section 176, in particular
176(1), and (3), which read as follows:38
33Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue (Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) 233.
34TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain’
(1982) 91(5) Yale Law J 857.
35Sarah Paterson, ‘Reflections on English Law Schemes of Arrangement in Distress and
Proposals for Reform’ (2018) 15(3) ECFR 472, 488. A similar approach was adopted
by the court in Malaysia in Kamuja Corporation Sdn Bhd v Aras Dimensi Sdn Bhd (in
liquidation) (2015) AMEJ 338 [83].
36Aiman Nariman Mohd and Effendy Othman, Malaysia Company Law: Principles and
Practices (2nd edn, Commerce Clearing House (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd 2018) 826.
37See text to n 134–138.
38See CA 2016 section 366(1),(2) & (3).
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(1) Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a company and
its creditors or any class of them or between the company and its members or
any class of them the Court may, on the application in a summary way of the
company or of any creditor or member of the company, or in the case of a
company being wound up of the liquidator, order a meeting of the creditors or
class of creditors or of the members of the company or class of members to be
summoned in such manner as the Court directs.
(3) If a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the creditors
or class of creditors or members or class of members present and voting either
in person or by proxy at the meeting or the adjourned meeting agrees to any
compromise or arrangement the compromise or arrangement shall, if approved
by order of the Court, be binding on all the creditors or class of creditors or on
the members or class of members, as the case may be, and also on the company
or, in the case of a company in the course of being wound up, on the liquidator
and contributories of the company.
The SOA under the CA 1965 has a number of features which are in com-
mon with those found in the amended version of the JSCAA 1870.39 First, it is
a compromise or arrangement which may be made between a company and its
creditors or any of its class or between a company and its members or any of
its class. Next, the application to court for sanction may be made by a company
or its creditor or its member. The application need not be made during a liquid-
ation process but if it is so made then the application to court is made by the
liquidator. For the approval of the SOA by creditors or members, it must be by
those present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting. A most
important feature is that a decision of the creditors or members representing
three-fourths in value of the total respective creditors or members, if sanctioned
by the court, is binding on the respective dissentients. As for the mandatory
requirement of an explanatory statement which was added to the JSCAA
1870,40 the similarity is found in section 177 of the CA 1965.41 As explained
earlier, the significant difference between the SOA in the CA 1965 and the UK
version is the presence of the restraining order in the former which was adopted
from the Australian version of the SOA.42 It is contained in section 176(10) of
the CA 1965.43
In general, the SOA procedure to restructure a financially distressed private
company would briefly involve three stages by which it becomes binding on all
dissentients: first, an application is made by the company to the court for the sum-
moning of one or more meetings of creditors and/or members including each
respective class where the interests of the creditors and/or members are dissimilar;
secondly, the proposals supported by an explanatory statement must be placed
before those meetings and approved by the requisite majority; and thirdly, if the
proposals are approved, then the court may exercise its discretion to sanction
39See text to n 28.
40Ibid.
41See CA 2016 section 369.
42See text to n 11–13.
43See CA 2016 section 368.
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them.44 During the application to the court, it is usual to also seek an order of
court to restrain further proceedings or actions against the company pursuant to
section 176(10) of the CA 1965.45
4.1.2. Compromise or arrangement
The SOA is a statutory scheme arising out of a compromise or arrangement
made by a company with its creditors or their classes and/or members or their
classes but the term, ‘compromise’ is not defined in the CA 1965,46 and the
term, ‘arrangement’ as defined in section 176(11),47 ‘includes a reorganization
of the share capital of a company by the consolidation of shares of different
classes or by the division of shares into shares of different classes or by both
these methods’.
The courts have interpreted the term, ‘compromise’ to involve some form of
dispute over rights of parties, whether, actual or potential.48 In a compromised
SOA, the creditors either agree to accept a sum lesser than their claims against the
scheme company as full and final settlement of their claims or agree to convert
their claims into shares of the scheme company.49 Upon the satisfaction of the
agreed compromise, the scheme company is able to continue its business free of
those claims.50 On the other hand, although a statutory definition is given for the
term ‘arrangement’, it is regarded as a ‘partial definition’ only.51 This is con-
firmed in a judicial observation in the UK case of Re Lehman Brothers
International (Europe).52 Similar observations on the partial definition of
‘arrangement’ have been made in Australia with the view that it must be given a
liberal construction,53 and that it is not restricted in its meaning although it is
44Tracey Evans Chan, ‘Arrangements and Judicial Management’ in Tan Cheng Han
(ed), Walter Woon on Company Law (Revised 3rd edn. Sweet & Maxwell, 2009)
663–664. See also Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 830–831. Sham Chin Yen & Ors
v Mansion Properties Sdn Bhd (2019) 1 LNS 781 [33]; Transmile Group Berhad &
Anor v Malaysian Trustee Berhad & 13 Ors (2012) 3 AMR 159, 167–169.
45See Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Singapore 2013, 134 [2(1)].
<https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Revised%20Report%20of%
20the%20Insolvency%20Law%20Review%20Committee.pdf> accessed 11 January
2018. See also Sham Chin Yen & Ors v Mansion Properties Sdn Bhd (2019) 1 LNS
781, [32] and [34]. For CA 2016, see section 368.
46K V Padmanabha Rau, Company Law of Malaysia – Shares, Meetings, Receivers and
Managers (International Law Book Services, 2003) 346. See also Azmi and Abd Razak
(n 1) 623. A similar situation exists for CA 2016.
47See CA 2016 section 365.
48Sneath v Valley Gold, Limited, (1893) 1 Ch 477, 494–495; Hadi Hassan v Suria
Records Sdn Bhd & Ors (2004) 8 CLJ 225, 230. See also Mohd Sulaiman and Othman
(n 36) 826.
49Shanthy Rachagan, Janine Pascoe and Anil Joshi, Principles of Company Law in
Malaysia (Malayan Law Journal 2002) 624. See also Azmi and Abd Razak (n 1) 624.
50Ibid.
51Payne (n 7) 20 footnote 10.
52(2010) 1 BCLC 496, 519 where Lord Neuberger MR observed that the term
‘arrangement’ should be given a wide meaning.
53Re Capilano Honey Ltd (2018) 131 ACSR 1, 21; Re Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd
(in liq) and Others (No. 2) (2013) 95 ACSR 685, 690.
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associated with the term ‘compromise’ in the provisions governing SOA.54 Both
the academic and judicial observations are fortified with the use of the word,
‘includes’ in the definition of the term, ‘arrangement’. The Court of Appeal,
speaking through Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was), in Tenaga Nasional Bhd
v Tekali Prospecting Sdn Bhd,55 stated that:
Particular emphasis is to be placed upon the word ‘includes’ in this definition.
On settled principles of statutory interpretation, it is clear that when an Act of
Parliament employs the expression ‘includes’ to define some other word or
expression, the intention is to leave the meaning of the expression defined open
ended. By contrast, when the word ‘means’ is employed to define something,
there is a rebuttable presumption of statutory interpretation that Parliament
intends to restrict the meaning of the expression defined.56
Other cases have described the word, ‘includes’, as a word of enlargement
rather than of restriction which is capable of extended meaning other than the
given defined meaning in a statute.57
Given that one term, ‘compromise’ is not defined and the other term,
‘arrangement’ is partially defined in the statute, these statutory gaps were filled in
by the courts, with greater details this time with the decision in the UK case of Re
NFU Development Trust Ltd,58 where Brightman J expressed it as follows:
The word ‘compromise’ implies some element of accommodation on each side.
It is not apt to describe total surrender. A claimant who abandons his claim is
not compromising it. Similarly, I think that the word ‘arrangement’ in this
section implies some element of give and take. Confiscation is not my idea of
an arrangement. A member whose rights are expropriated without any
compensating advantage is not, in my view, having his rights rearranged in any
legitimate sense of that expression.59
That passage by Brightman J was cited with approval by Siti Norma Yaakob J
(as she then was) in Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd,60
for the definition of ‘compromise’ and ‘arrangement’ in the provisions on SOA in
the CA 1965. Given the openness of the statutory definition for ‘compromise’ and
‘arrangement’ subject to certain restrictions imposed by the courts, for instance,
that there must be a ‘give and take’ by the parties involved in the SOA,61 the
54Windsor v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (1992) 106 ALR 282,
290 which approved of the observations of Lowe ACJ in an earlier case,
Re International Harvester Co of Australia Pty Ltd (1953) VLR 669, 672.
55(2002) 2 MLJ 707.
56Ibid 714.
57Yii Ming Tung v Public Prosecutor (2015) 3 MLJ 596, 606–607; PP v Mohd Farid
bin Mohd Sukis & Anor (2002) 3 MLJ 401, 426.
58(1973) 1 All ER 135.
59Ibid 140.
60(1990) 2 MLJ 31, 35.
61Payne (n 7) 21. See also In re Savoy Hotel Ltd (1981) Ch 351, 359–361; Re Jeff
Group Plc (2016) BCC 289 291; Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (2009) 73 ACSR
385, 394-395; Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd (1990) 2 MLJ
31, 35.
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purpose of the provisions on SOA affords flexibility in facilitating a scheme
which can overcome the difficulties of securing the unanimous consent of all
creditors and prevent minority creditors from frustrating a beneficial creditors’
scheme.62 The same observation was made on the SOA in Singapore which is
said to ‘offer companies great leeway to negotiate commercially acceptable solu-
tions on debt restructuring’.63 The courts have further contributed to the flexibility
of the SOA for instance, by holding that the pari passu principle does not apply
to SOA,64 and that guarantees given by directors of the applicant company to the
scheme creditors as a security for its debts may be waived.65
However, the restrictions imposed by the courts on the availability of the
‘compromise’ and ‘arrangement’ offered by the SOA provisions meant that the
scheme not only must comply with the notion of ‘give and take’ by the parties
involved in the scheme but it must not, be in breach of the law or authorise a
transaction which exceeds the powers of the company.66 On the notion of ‘give
and take’, the courts have ruled that the scheme creditors must not have surren-
dered or abandoned all their claims against the scheme company without receiv-
ing any compensating advantage or which amount to a confiscation of their
62Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 830 in referring to the observations of Street J in
Re Norfolk Island v Byron Bay Whaling Co, 1 NSWR 221 (1970) 223 on the
equivalent provisions on compromise and arrangement in the Australian Companies Act
on its purposes. See also Jason Harris, ‘Class Warfare in Debt Restructuring: Does
Australia need cross-class cram down for creditors’ schemes of arrangement’, (2017)
36(1) Univ Qld Law J 73, 81.
63Meng Seng Wee, Whither the Scheme of Arrangement in Singapore: More Chapter
11, Less Scheme? (2017) 4. <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/wee_the_
scheme_of_arrangement_in_singapore.pdf>accessed 16 May 2019.
64The Federal Court in Francis a/l Augustine Pereira v Dataran Mantin Sdn Bhd &
Ors and other appeals (2014) 6 MLJ 56, 73-75 approved of the decision in the
Singapore Court of Appeal in Hitachi Plant Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v
Eltraco International Pte Ltd (2003) 4 SLR 384, 411–412 [83–84], that the courts are
empowered to sanction schemes under the SOA provisions which may potentially be in
breach of the pari passu principle where the company is either insolvent or at the risk
of liquidation. The pari passu principle is an old equitable principle and a cornerstone
of the insolvency law structure which provides for equal distribution of the assets of the
wound up company among its unsecured creditors – see Andrew Keay, McPherson,
The Law of Company Liquidation (4th edn, LBC Information Services 1999) 574–577;
Pembinaan Lagenda Unggul Sdn Bhd (dalam penggulungan voluntari pemiutang-
pemiutang) v Geohan Sdn Bhd and another appeal (2018) 196 MLJU, [142–146];
Malaysian Trustees Bhd v Transmile Group Bhd & Ors (2012) 3 MLJ 679, 689.
65In the High Court case of Intrakota Komposit Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sogelease Advance
(M) Sdn Bhd (2004) 8 CLJ 276, 298, Abdul Malik Ishak J (as he then was) opined that
the SOA scheme may be used to discharge third party guarantees given in favour of the
scheme creditors as security for the company’s debts in line with Singapore Court of
Appeal decision in Daewoo Singapore Pte Ltd v CEL Tractors Pte Ltd (2001) 2 SLR
791, 806-808.
66Re Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd (2009) 73 ACSR 385, 395; Re NRMA Ltd (2000) 33
ACSR 595, 603. In the case of In Re Maxisegar Sdn Bhd (2010) 7 CLJ 1033, 1045,
Hamid Sultan Abu Backer J (as he then was) gave an example where the court will not
sanction a scheme where its purpose was to save the company from insolvency due to
misappropriation of funds by its directors at the expense of the creditors.
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rights.67 Hence, the parties involved in the scheme must make some concessions
and give up something in return for their benefits. It is observed that in a SOA
application, the paramount consideration for the court is the ‘safeguarding of the
welfare of the creditors’.68
4.1.3. Creditors or class of creditors
4.1.3.1. Lack of a definition. The parties at the core of a SOA, whether it be a
compromise or arrangement by a company, are ‘its creditors or any class of
them’,69 but neither the CA 1965 nor the CA 2016 offers any definition on what
constitutes a company’s creditors or class of creditors.70 The reference to a com-
pany’s creditors or class of creditors can be traced back to when the SOA was
first conceived in section 2 of the JSCAA 1870.71 The scope of that provision
was subsequently enlarged to include its availability to members and solvent com-
panies but it was initially available only in situations where the company was in
the process of being wound up.72
4.1.3.2. Creditors. Since the SOA was first made available under the JSCAA 1870
as an alternative to winding up, the courts in Re Midland Coal, Coke, and Iron
Company (the Midland Coal case),73 have held that the word, ‘creditors’ must be
construed ‘in the widest sense, and that it includes all persons having any pecuni-
ary claims against the company’ whether actual or contingent, a meaning which is
consistent with that used for winding up. The rationale for the connotation was
explained in the Australian case of Re Glendale Land Development Ltd (in liq)
(the Glendale case),74 as necessary otherwise the SOA in the JSCAA 1870 would
have been rendered practically useless since ‘creditors’ for purpose of the SOA
would be different from that in a winding up, therefore ‘creditors’ must embrace
‘all persons entitled to prove in the winding up’.75 This definition of ‘creditors’ in
the SOA under the CA 1965 has been adopted by Mohamed Dzaiddin J (as he
then was) in Re Butterworth Products & Industries Sdn Bhd (Khaw Saw Mooi &
Ors, Petitioners).76 The word, ‘creditors’ by reference to those persons who are
able to prove in a winding up of the scheme company, has been followed by
Nallini Pathmanathan J (as she then was) in Transmile Group Berhad & Anor v
Malaysian Trustee Berhad & 13 Ors.77
67Ibid, See also Re NFU Development Trust Ltd (1973) 1 All ER 135, 140;
Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd (1990) 2 MLJ 31, 35.
68Re Kai Peng Berhad (2007) 8 MLJ 122, 129. See also Francis a/l Augustine Pereira
v Dataran Mantin Sdn Bhd & Ors and other appeals (2014) 6 MLJ 56, 71; Ex parte
High-5 Conglomerate Berhad & Anor and another case (2015) MLJU 444 [52].
69See section 176(1) of the CA 1965 in respect of a creditors’ SOA, which is the focus
of this paper as opposed to a member SOA, see text to n 7.
70Rau (n 46) 347, 352. See also Payne (n 7) 85.
71See text to n 27.
72See text to n 28.
73(1895) 1 Ch 267, 271 (High Court) & 277 (Court of Appeal).
74(1982) 7 ACLR 171.
75Ibid, 175.
76(1992) 1 MLJ 429, 434.
77(2012) 3 AMR 159, 182.
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In line with the wide definition favoured by the courts, the word, ‘creditors’
has been held to encompass a contingent creditor who is the guarantor in respect
of a guarantee granted by the scheme company even though action has not been
commenced in court.78 It was also construed to include a secured creditor in
contrast to an unsecured creditor;79 a creditor in respect of each of his multiple
agreements with the scheme company;80 creditors of subsidiaries of the
scheme company.81
However, the inclusion of contingent creditors in the word, ‘creditors’ may
pose problems of interpretation for the courts as to its ambit,82 which happened in
the UK case of In re T & N Ltd and others,83 (the T & N case). In this case, the
court noted the expansive meaning to be given to ‘creditors’ which included con-
tingent creditors and held that potential future claimants of asbestos-related tor-
tious claims against the scheme company fell within its ambit even though they
did not have a provable debt in a winding up.84
In Australia where its SOA provisions were the genesis of the SOA under the
CA 1965, the majority of the cases have come to a similar conclusion as that in
the T & N case that tort claimants are contingent creditors for purpose of SOA
even though the claims are not liquidated or not provable in winding up.85
Interestingly, the same judge in the Glendale case, (a decision which has been
78Re Butterworth Products & Industries Sdn Bhd (Khaw Saw Mooi & Ors, Petitioners)
(1992) 1 MLJ 429, 434. It was held that a contingent creditor has a pecuniary claim
against the scheme creditor whether the claim is liquidated or not and whether it was
subject to a contingency which was in line with the authorities such as In re Midland
Coal, Coke, and Iron Company, (1895) 1 Ch 267; Sovereign Life Assurance Company v
Dodd, (1892) 2 QB 573.
79Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd (1990) 2 MLJ 31, 33. See
also Nite Beauty Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Bayer (M) Sdn Bhd (2000) 3 MLJ 314,
317 where the approved SOA comprised unsecured and secured creditors.
80In Alias Bin Mohd Salleh v Peninsular Park Sdn Bhd (2016) MLJU 474 [51–52], a
buyer of several housing plots from a scheme company was treated as a creditor for
each of the plot agreement and carried with it one vote for each of the separate debt as
represented in each agreement. On the other hand, where the buyer of a plot had his
agreement validly terminated, then he is no longer a creditor of the scheme company,
see Peninsular Park Sdn Bhd v Ai-Af Holdings Sdn Bhd (2015) MLJU 745 [31].
81Wangsini Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Willway Industries Sdn Bhd) v Grand United
Holdings Bhd (1998) 5 MLJ 345, 361.
82Payne (n 7) 181.
83(2006) 1 WLR 1728.
84Ibid 1747–1749. It was noted in Payne (n 7) 181, that the decision in the T & N case
prompted the authorities in the UK to amend the Insolvency Rules 1986 as in r.
13.12(2), to provide that a tortious liability was a provable debt in a winding up if
either the cause of action had accrued at the date of winding up or if all the elements
for establishment of the cause of action existed at that date except for
actionable damage.
85See Re Asia Oil & Minerals Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 333; Re BDC Investments Ltd
(1988) 13 ACLR 201, where in both cases, holders of options to purchase its shares as
issued earlier by a company seeking a SOA were regarded as contingent creditors for
purpose of the SOA. Contrast that with some South Australian cases as reviewed in
Smith v Carr and Others (1993) 10 ACSR 427, 431 and in SAAG Oilfield Engineering
(S) Pte Ltd (formerly known as Derrick Services Singapore Pte Ltd) v Shaik Abu Bakar
bin Abdul Sukol and another and another appeal (2012) 2 SLR 189, 200–201 that a
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followed in Malaysia), McLelland J, has subsequently clarified his earlier obser-
vation that ‘creditors’ referred to those parties with ‘claims which would be enti-
tled to be admitted to proof if the company were wound up’,86 was not to limit
the scope of the word, ‘creditors’ but instead to include parties with unliquidated,
prospective or contingent claims even though difficulties were encountered in
assessing their values.87 The rationale for the clarification was in view of the
absence in the SOA provisions of the anomalous rule which exclude from proof
in the winding up of an insolvent company for parties having an unliquidated
claim in tort unlike the provisions for winding up.88 The Court of Appeal in
Singapore has endorsed this clarification noting that the anomalous rule is simi-
larly only present in section 327(2) of its Companies Act (which is identical to
section 291(2) of the CA 1965), a provision on proof of debts in winding up,89
and not in its SOA provisions (which is identical to section 176 of the
CA 1965).90
An important distinction between section 2 of the JSCAA 1870 when the
Midland Coal case was decided and the SOA provisions in section 176 of the CA
1965 is that in the former, SOA was only applicable to wound up companies
while in the latter, SOA is available to both solvent and insolvent companies.
This distinction was pointed out by the Court of Appeal in Singapore,91 which
tends to suggest that a broad view of ‘creditors’ without limiting it to the provisions
in winding up is preferred and justified as decided in cases such as the T & N case
and in the majority of cases in Australia.
4.1.3.3. Class of creditors. The CA 1965 in section 176(1) provides for a SOA to
be made by a scheme company with its creditors or class of creditors.92 However,
the word. ‘class’ is not defined,93 and it is left to the courts to formulate a test for
it.94 The Federal Court in Francis a/l Augustine Pereira v Dataran Mantin Sdn
party with an unliquidated claim against a scheme company would not be regarded as a
creditor for the SOA.
86Re Glendale Land Development Ltd (in liq) (1982) 7 ACLR 171, 176.
87Re R L Child & Co Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 673, 674. This decision has been
followed in Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd v Western Australia (1992) 7 ACSR 472.
88Ibid. The anomalous rule is present in section 438(2) of the Companies (NSW) Code
which governed proof of debts in winding up of insolvent companies.
89Andrew Hicks and Walter Woon, The Companies Act of Singapore – An Annotation
(Butterworth & Co (Asia) Pte Ltd 1989) 597–598 which stated that unliquidated claims
in tort are not provable in the winding up of an insolvent company in relation to
section 327(2) of the Companies Act of Singapore. An identical view is expressed for
section 291(2) of the CA 1965 in The Annotated Statutes of Malaysia – Companies Act
1965 (Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd 1995) 688.
90SAAG Oilfield Engineering (S) Pte Ltd (formerly known as Derrick Services
Singapore Pte Ltd) v Shaik Abu Bakar bin Abdul Sukol and another and another
appeal (2012) 2 SLR 189, 202, 212.
91Ibid 199.
92For CA 2016, see section 366(3).
93Rau (n 46) 352. See also Illiayas (n 15) xlix.
94Payne (n 7) 85. In Sovereign Life Assurance Company v Dodd, (1892) 2 QB 573,
583, the court opined that the word, ‘class’ is ‘vague’.
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Bhd & Ors and other appeals (Dataran Mantin case),95 has approved of the test
formulated to determine a ‘class of creditors’ in the UK case of Sovereign Life
Assurance Company v Dodd (the Sovereign Life case), that is, a class ‘must be
confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impos-
sible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest’.96
The placement of a creditor in the correct class or group of creditors is signifi-
cantly important when its vote will determine the outcome at the class meeting on
whether to accept or reject the SOA which may result in the failure of the
scheme.97 In the case of Baneng Holdings Berhad & Ors v Cimb Bank Berhad,98
the creditors of the scheme company included CIMB Bank Berhad and Maybank,
both being banking entities and were not in favour of the scheme.99 However, the
High Court held that both banking entities should not be put in the same class of
creditors as CIMB Bank Berhad is a secured creditor while Maybank is an
unsecured creditor with dissimilar rights against the scheme company.100
The fate of a SOA may rest on whether the creditor has been wrongfully excluded
from the class of creditors which will result in the court not giving its sanction to the
scheme.101 In the case of PB Securities Sdn Bhd v Autoways Holding Bhd,102 the
scheme company in its scheme application which included a RO had included PB
Securities Sdn Bhd (PBSSB) in its proposal as one of its scheme creditors. A cred-
itors’ meeting was called and PBSSB had indicated in the proxy form that it will vote
against the scheme. At the creditors’ meeting, PBSSB was excluded from it and
hence its vote was excluded. The Court of Appeal held that PBSSB was wrongfully
excluded from the scheme since the scheme company had at all material times
acknowledged its creditor status with its inclusion in the list of creditors in its scheme
proposal and the sending of notices of meetings and proxy forms.103 Under those cir-
cumstances, the meeting for unsecured creditors which had although obtained the
requisite approval of creditors was declared by the court to be invalid.104
From an examination of the cases pertaining to class of creditors, it is
observed that the classification of creditors in SOA is an important feature which
will determine the fate of the scheme. The scheme company bears the burden of
placing the creditors into the correct class of creditors.105 In multiple classes, it
will need to secure the requisite majority votes in each of those classes.106
95(2014) 6 MLJ 56, 68–69 & 75.
96(1892) 2 QB 573, 583.




101Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 851. See also Illiayas (n 15) xlix.
102(2000) 4 MLJ 417.
103Ibid 425–427.
104Ibid 427.
105UDL Argos Engineering & Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Li Oi Lin, Final Appeal No.
11 of 2001 (Civil), (3rd December 2001), [27(1)]; The Royal Bank of Scotland NV
(formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd and
another appeal (2012) 2 SLR 213, 234.
106Harris (n 62) 85. See also Mohan Gopalan, ‘Creditor Schemes of Arrangement and
Dissenting Creditors Protection’, (2018) 30 SAcLJ 902, 906.
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The rationale of having a proper class of creditors lies in the power wielded by
creditors, which is also their right, to vote in favour of or against the proposed
scheme. If the class is drawn too broad, then, it could result in oppression of the
minority with dissimilar rights, by the majority,107 or in the words expressed in
the Sovereign Life case, it will result in ‘confiscation and injustice’.108 On the
other hand, if the class is drawn too narrow, then, a small minority with signifi-
cant voting powers could frustrate the scheme by vetoing it.109
In addition, a SOA is possible even with a distinct class of unsecured creditors
which was approved in the Dataran Mantin case,110 where the SOA between a
housing developer, and the purchasers of its housing units was sanctioned to the
exclusion of other unsecured creditors such as its suppliers. A distinguishing fea-
ture of this case is that if the scheme was not approved then the only secured cred-
itor, OCBC Bank could exercise its enforcement rights over the secured land, the
subject of the housing development which would not have yielded any surplus
from the proceeds of foreclosure to benefit any unsecured creditors let alone settle
the Bank.111
With the SOA in place, at least 660 purchasers of the housing units could
benefit from its completion and the loan due to OCBC Bank could be settled.112
The test formulated in the Sovereign Life case for classification of creditors,
that is, a class ‘must be confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimi-
lar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their com-
mon interest’,113 also include an element of common interest of the creditors. The
reference to common interests of creditors was highlighted in the principles for
classification of creditors as summarised by Lord Millett NPJ in delivering the
judgment for the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in the case of UDL Argos
Engineering & Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Li Oi Lin (the UDL case).114 His
Lordship concluded that ‘persons whose rights are sufficiently similar that they
can consult together with a view to their common interest should be summoned to
a single meeting’, but added that ‘the test is based on similarity or dissimilarity of
107Ibid, 86. See also The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro
Bank NV) and others v TT International Ltd and another appeal, 2 SLR 213 (2012):
260; TH Heavy Engineering Bhd & Ors (2018) MLJU 466, [149]; Transmile Group
Berhad & Anor v Malaysian Trustee Berhad & 13 Ors (2012) 3 AMR 159, 175–176.
108Sovereign Life Assurance Company v Dodd, (1892) 2 QB 573, 583.
109Harris (n 62) 86. See also UDL Argos Engineering & Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Li
Oi Lin, Final Appeal No. 11 of 2001 (Civil), (3rd December 2001), [26]; Geoff O’Dea,
Julian Long and Alexandra Smyth, Schemes of Arrangement – Law and Practice
(Oxford University Press 2012) 38; Transmile Group Berhad & Anor v Malaysian




113This test formulated by Bowen LJ in the Sovereign Life case, 583 has been followed
by the Federal Court in the Dataran Mantin case (n 95) 68–69 & 75.
114Final Appeal No. 11 of 2001 (Civil), (3rd December 2001). This case has been cited
with approval in Malaysia, in cases such as In re Sateras Resources (Malaysia) Bhd
(2005) 6 CLJ 194, 210; Transmile Group Berhad & Anor v Malaysian Trustee Berhad
& 13 Ors (2012) 3 AMR 159, 189.
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legal rights against the company, not on similarity or dissimilarity of interest not
derived from such legal rights.115
The formulated test is that similarity of legal rights and not interests is cru-
cial to the classification of creditors exercise but a distinction may still have to
be made between rights of creditors and their interests.116 It has been held that
creditors who will receive different interest rates or whose debts are repayable
at different times merely represent interests that do not affect the rights of cred-
itors and thus did not warrant separate classes of creditors.117 Similarly, where
certain creditors are given once only rights to appoint directors in the restruc-
tured company, it does not make the rights of those creditors different from
other creditors and affect their ability to consult each other, hence they are not
required to be placed in a class different from those who are not given such
rights.118 Also, it was held that although certain unsecured creditors of a
scheme company stood to gain more benefits or interests by virtue of also hold-
ing guarantees from a third party, that itself do not warrant placing them in a
separate class from the other unsecured creditors provided that they do not gain
more than 100% of their debts.119
While the principles associated with classification of creditors are not in
doubt, a commentator,120 has cast doubt on the decision in the Re Butterworth
Products & Industries Sdn Bhd (Khaw Saw Mooi & Ors, Petitioners).121 In that
case, MUI Finance Bhd (MUI) was the holder of a guarantee issued by the
scheme creditor as a security for a loan given to a housing development company,
Bagan Town Development Sdn Bhd (Bagan Town) which had also given a charge
to MUI on its property. Thus, MUI was a contingent creditor (as held by the
judge) of the scheme company and a secured creditor of Bagan Town. Having
decided that MUI was a contingent creditor of the scheme creditor, the issue
before the court was whether its rights were so dissimilar to the judgment cred-
itors as to warrant having a separate class. The judge decided that MUI was in the
same class as the judgment creditors on the basis that ‘the word “creditor” should
be interpreted in the widest sense’.122 On that basis, it appears that the commenta-
tor is justified in questioning whether the appropriate test as laid down in the
Sovereign Life case was applied, that is, whether MUI as a contingent creditor
(holding a guarantee in respect of a loan where a charge over a property is also
given to MUI) has similar rights as the judgment creditors of the scheme company
so as to be able to consult together with a view to their common interest.123
115Ibid [27(2)] & [27(3)].
116Primacom Holding GmbH v A Group of the Senior Lenders & Credit Agricole
(2011) EWHC (Ch) 3746 [46].
117Ibid [52–53].
118Nine Entitlement Group Limited (No. 1) (2012) FCA 1464 [61–64].
119Transmile Group Berhad & Anor v Malaysian Trustee Berhad & 13 Ors (2012) 3
AMR 159, 176–177.
120Illiayas (n 15) liii.
121(1992) 1 MLJ 429.
122Ibid 434.
123Illiayas (n 15) liii.
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Another disputable decision on the classification of creditors came up in the
case of Texfibre (Selangor) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Permata Merchant Bank Bhd.124
This case involved a SOA which had two classes of creditors, secured and
unsecured. In an application to amend the scheme, the court had to decide whether
a bank which had extended banking facilities to the scheme company based on
guarantees given by its directors should be placed in the class of secured creditors.
While the principle in the Sovereign Life case was adopted, but the court held
that the rights of the bank were similar to that of the secured creditors in that they
have foregone their rights to sue in exchange for issued shares.125 However, the
rights of the unsecured creditors were not discussed as to whether the rights of the
bank was so similar to theirs to be able to consult together with a view to their
common interests. In any event, it is unlikely that a bank which is merely holding
a guarantee given by the scheme company would be regarded as a secured cred-
itor and would have any similarity to consult together with a view to their com-
mon interests.126
In summary, while the principles for classification of creditors are settled, the
issues to be decided by the proposer of the SOA and to be resolved by the courts
as to first, whether a party is a ‘creditor’ followed by whether any separate class
of creditors should be formed is a matter which involves scrutiny of the facts by
the court.127
4.1.4. Creditors’ meetings
Having determined the status of scheme claimants as ‘creditors’ and whether any
‘class of creditors’ need to be formed, the next important matter is to call for
meetings as ordered by the court,128 to be held for the creditors or each class of
creditors to seek their approval of the proposed scheme. The approval at the cred-
itors’ meeting for the creditors or each class, if any, must be secured first by a
majority in number (the headcount test), and secondly by three-fourths in value of
the creditors present and voting in person or by proxy (majority in value test) at
their meeting or adjourned meeting.129 Upon securing the required approval, the
next step is for the scheme company to apply to the court for its sanction.130
Where the requisite numbers are secured followed by the court’s sanction, then its
effect is that the approval is binding on all creditors or creditors for each class, if
any, including the dissentients.131
124(1996) MLJU 175.
125Ibid 176–177.
126PB Securities Sdn Bhd v Autoways Holding Bhd (2000) 4 MLJ 417, where the bank
holding a guarantee of the scheme company was regarded as an unsecured creditor in
a SOA.
127Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd (2001) 2 BCLC 480, 529.
128Section 176(1) of the CA 1965 or section 366(1) of the CA 2016. See also
Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd (1990) 2 MLJ 31, 35.
129Section 176(3) of the CA 1965. For CA 2016 see section 366(3).
130Ibid. See also Boon Wah Air-Conditioning Engineering Sdn Bhd v Bina Goodyear
Bhd (2014) 7 MLJ 679, 684.
131Ibid. See also Primus (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Rin Kei Mei & Ors (2012) 1 CLJ
176, 201.
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Payne is critical of the headcount test in making a SOA difficult to achieve by
placing veto powers in the hands of a small number of creditors out of proportion
to their claims in value especially after securing the requisite numbers in the
majority in value test.132 She added that there are calls both in the UK and in
other parts of the world to remove the headcount test which was first introduced
in section 2 of the JSCAA 1870 and retained in successor Acts.133
Although the creditors’ meeting is integral to the SOA process but the CA
1965 is bereft of provisions on the rules and procedures for convening and
conducting the meetings. The structure for SOA has been described as
‘barebone’ in its framework.134 The Court of Appeal in Singapore in their
case,135 noted in particular, the absence of rules on the conduct of creditors’
meeting;136 a lack of mechanism for proof and adjudication of debts including
the resolution of disputed debts;137 and duties of the chairman of the creditors’
meetings.138
The absence of provisions on creditors’ meeting in the SOA under the CA
1965 was evident in the case of Boon Wah Air-Conditioning Engineering Sdn
Bhd v Bina Goodyear Bhd,139 where the dispute was as to whether the requisite
approval was obtained at a creditors’ meeting. The court referred to the minutes
of the creditors’ meeting as prima facie evidence of the outcome of the meeting
by relying on section 156 of the CA 1965.140 However that provision applies spe-
cifically to general meetings, being meetings of shareholders; meetings of direc-
tors and its managers only. Thus, the lack of rules governing creditors’ meeting
for SOA had led to the court to utilise provisions in the statute expressly meant
for other types of meetings.
Thus, it is incumbent on the scheme company in its application to the court to
summon a creditors’ meeting to also seek its directions on the procedural aspects
of the meeting such as the notice period; parties to decide on the time, date and
venue of the meeting; mode of voting whether by poll or show of hand; matters
on appointment of proxy; and the chairman’s obligations to submit a report or
minutes on the outcome of the meeting.141 In view of the lack of any standardised
rules relating to the creditors’ meeting, the convening and conduct of the cred-
itors’ meetings for each SOA will differ from court to court and posed issues at
the sanctioning stage as illustrated above.
132Payne (n 7) 64.
133Ibid 61–63.
134The description was directed at Singapore’s SOA but given the similarity of its
provisions with that in the CA 1965, the description is apt. See also Wee (n 63) 5;
Tracey Evans Chan, ‘Schemes of Arrangement as a Corporate Rescue Mechanism: The
Singapore Experience’, (2009) 18 International Insolvency Review 37, 40.
135The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and




139(2014) 7 MLJ 679.
140Ibid 683.
141Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 848–849.
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4.1.5. Restraining order (RO)
4.1.5.1. Background. Although the SOA under the CA 1965 is in many aspects
similar to the framework in the UK, but significantly the RO is absent from
the UK statutes.142 As explained earlier, the SOA in Malaysia is derived from the
Australian statute and shares provisions very similar to that for the Singapore
SOA.143 The law on RO for SOA is governed by section 176(10) of the CA
1965.144 The purpose of the RO and its extension as granted by the courts is to
protect the scheme companies and its assets from pending suits filed by its cred-
itors by restraining those proceedings including winding up except with leave of
court, while it is engaged in the process of formulating and effecting a SOA for
the benefit of its creditors.145
However, the authorities in recognising that the RO could be abused by the
scheme companies in repeatedly seeking its extension without any concrete SOA
proposal while retaining the same management which may have caused the com-
pany its financial predicament thereby delaying the payment of its debts, intro-
duced a limited duration for a RO with a new section 176(10A),146 which came
into force on 1 November 1998.147 The new provision empowered the court to
grant a RO for a period of not more than ninety days with possible extensions, if
and only if the court is satisfied on good reason in the case of the RO or its exten-
sion, that certain conditions are met as found in paras (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sec-
tion 176(10A).148 These four new conditions are: (a) the presence of a SOA
proposal between a company and involving at least one-half in value of all its
creditors or any classes of creditors;149 (b) the necessity of having a RO for the
proposed SOA;150 (c) a statement of affairs of the company with its current state
142Payne (n 7) 355.
143See text to n 12–13.
144For CA 2016 see section 368.
145Ex parte High-5 Conglomerate Berhad & Anor and another case (2015) MLJU 444,
[45]. See also PECD Bhd & Anor v Merino-ODD Sdn Bhd & Ors (2009) 3 MLJ 362,
367; Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 858.
146CD No. 10 (n 4) 63–68. Another form of abuse was revealed in Re Foursea
Construction (M) Sdn Bhd (1998) 4 MLJ 99, 103, where the scheme company having
obtained a limited period RO but did not seek an extension upon its expiry and instead
file a fresh ex parte RO application in another High Court.
147Re Sanda Industries Bhd & Ors (1999) 1 CLJ 459, 460.
148Ibid. The words, ‘good reason’ to satisfy the court are construed to mean a bona fide
proposed SOA has been filed and presented with sufficient disclosure of details to
enable the creditors to decide on its feasibility and merits; it is also fair and reasonable;
the proposed SOA is not bound to fail; and the proposed SOA will provide for the
safeguarding of the interests of the creditors of the scheme company – see Re Kai Peng
Berhad (2007) 8 MLJ 122, 128; Intrakota Komposit Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sogelease
Advance (M) Sdn Bhd (2004) 8 CLJ 276, 300.
149Re Kai Peng Berhad (2007) 8 MLJ 122, 129 where the court opined that this
condition is satisfied where the applicant shows that the proposed scheme involves
more than 50% of its creditors which include secured and unsecured creditors,
irrespective of whether they are subsidiaries or otherwise of the applicant. Further, the
court clarified that at this stage, the applicant need not show proof that more than 50%
of its creditors have approved the proposed scheme but that they are included in it. See
also Baneng Holdings Berhad & Ors v Cimb Bank Berhad (2013) MLJU 269 [11].
150Ibid 130–131.
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not exceeding three days before the filing of the SOA application has been filed
with the court;151 and (d) a person nominated as a director of the company by a
majority of its creditors in the SOA application is approved by the court.152
The introduction of the new conditions which are mandatory to an application
for an RO is to curb past abuses of applicant companies by requiring them to
make a full disclosure of the proposed SOA to their creditors at an early stage so
as to prevent injustice to the creditors who are legally entitled to enforce execu-
tion proceedings but are suddenly stifled by a RO without any proper prior notice
of it.153
4.1.5.2. Time for compliance with the RO conditions. However, the courts have
come to divergent views on whether those four mandatory conditions are applic-
able at the initial and subsequent stages of an application for the RO or only when
any application to extend the RO is sought. The latter view was most clearly
observed by the High Court in Chee Teck Fah v Rei Management Sdn Bhd,154
that the four conditions are not applicable where the RO is for the initial period of
not more than 90 days. The court found support for this observation in two earlier
cases, the first of which, was decided by the High Court in Jin Lin Wood
Industries Sdn Bhd and Others v Mulpha International Bhd,155 which only
alluded to the satisfaction of the four conditions in an application for extension of
the RO but did not include it for the initial 90 days RO. The second case again
decided by the High Court in Pelangi Airways Sdn Bhd v Mayban Trustee Bhd,156
offered doubtful support since it was concluded by the court that the initial RO
application had been irregular due to the failure of the applicant to satisfy the four
conditions, notably, para (d) which was consistent with the cited case of Re Sanda
Industries Bhd & Ors, that no restraining order at any stage can be granted by
the court where no proposed director has been approved and appointed by
the court.157
On the other hand, in several cases also decided by the High Court,158 the four
conditions necessary for a RO apply even to the initial application where the RO
151Ibid 130.
152Ibid 132 where the court observed that it has the ultimate say in the appointment of
the director which will be decided based on his credentials and that he has no interest
directly or indirectly in the scheme company and is independent and possess no conflict
of interest in representing the creditors. See also Pelangi Airways Sdn Bhd v Mayban
Trustee Bhd (2001) 6 CLJ 129, 135; Re Sanda Industries Bhd & Ors (1999) 1 CLJ
459, 460.
153Ranjan Chandran, ‘The Recent Amendments to Section 176 of the Companies Act
1965’, (1999) 1 CLJ i, i. See also CD No. 10 (n 4) 67–68.
154(2016) 1 LNS 1221.
155(2004) MLJU 497.
156(2001) 6 CLJ 129.
157Ibid 135–136.
158The reported decisions on the conditions necessary for RO have so far been confined
to the High Court only. However it is noted that the High Court in Bina Goodyear Bhd
v Ambank (M) Bhd & Anor (2014) 10 MLJ 603, 609-610 had remarked that the
applicant in that case had earlier vide Summons No. 24-NCC-126-04 of 2013 applied
for an initial RO which was dismissed by the High Court for its failure to comply with
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is for a period of not more than 90 days. These cases include the above cited
Re Sanda Industries Bhd & Ors;159 Re PECD Bhd & Anor (No. 2);160 and
Re Sanmatech Sdn Bhd.161
Those four conditions are replicated in seriatim in the RO provisions under
section 368(2)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the CA 2016. In the case of Barakah
Offshore Petroleum Berhad & Anor v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn
Bhd & 3 Ors (Barakah case),162 the High Court had to contend with the issue
whether the applicant had to comply with the four conditions at the time of apply-
ing the initial RO of not more than 3months.163 In accepting that the four condi-
tions for obtaining a RO under the CA 2016 have previously appeared under the
CA 1965 as an amendment under the Companies (Amendment) (No.2) Bill 1998,
the court took judicial notice of the explanatory statement for the amendment
introducing the four conditions that ‘restraining orders under that subsection are
only granted under specific conditions to avoid any abuse’, and held that the four
conditions are required to be satisfied by the applicant when applying for a RO at
any time including the initial period.164
In any event, the four conditions must be complied with each time that the
applicant applies for an extension of the RO,165 but under the CA 2016 the max-
imum period for the extension is nine months.166
4.1.5.3. Difficulties in compliance with the RO conditions. Given that the four con-
ditions must be complied with by the applicant each time a fresh application is
made for a RO or its extension, the applicant would encounter difficulties in satis-
fying condition (d) in putting forth a person nominated by a majority of its cred-
itors.167 In attempting to meet this condition, the applicant would have to disclose
to at least the majority of its creditors its proposed SOA and its application for a
RO in a convincing manner to enable it to garner their support for a nominated
director for the court’s approval and appointment. This attempt could backfire on
the conditions in section 176(10A)(c) and (d) of the CA 1965. On appeal to the Court
of Appeal, the applicant’s appeal was dismissed on the same grounds.
159(1999) 1 CLJ 459, 460.
160(2008) 10 CLJ 486, 489-490.
161(2007) 1 LNS 194.
162(2019) 3 AMR 673.
163Ibid 687–688. The initial period for the RO under the CA 2016 is not more than 3
months as compared to the period of not more than 90 days under the CA 1965 but
save for some slight changes the four conditions under both Acts are substantially
the same.
164Ibid 687–689. The court also followed the decisions made previously in the cases of
Re Sanda Industries Bhd & Ors (1999) 1 CLJ 459, and Re PECD Bhd & Anor (No. 2)
(2008) 10 CLJ 486.
165Metroplex Bhd & Ors v Morgan Stanley Emerging Markets Inc & Ors; RHB Sakura
Merchant Bankers Bhd & Ors (Interveners) (2005) 3 CLJ 810, 816.
166Section 368(2) of the CA 2016.
167Lee Shih, Restraining Order under a Scheme of Arrangement Must Satisfy Pre-
Conditions from the Start (25 April 2019), <https://themalaysianlawyer.com/2019/04/
25/restraining-order-scheme-arrangement-pre-conditions/> accessed 12 August 2019.
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the applicant with the creditors making haste with proceedings to recover its debts
and defeat the purpose of any restructuring.168
This condition also appears to be at odds with condition (a) where the appli-
cant need only to submit to the court a proposed SOA involving at least one-half
in value of its creditors without having to make any disclosure to them of its SOA
proposal. Thus while conditions (a) to (c) do not involve any disclosure of the RO
applicant’s proposed SOA to its creditors, condition (d) makes it difficult for a
company to have it satisfied once it is in a dire financial position. The judge in
the Barakah case,169 made an appropriate observation that companies seeking the
aid of a RO for its proposed SOA must make adequate preparation at an early
stage and not when after legal proceedings have commenced, judgment entered
and enforcement proceedings have started or about to be started.170
Notwithstanding the sound and salutary observation but it is far from easy to put
it into practice especially on timing the SOA application before the commence-
ment of any legal proceedings. After all, the fact that a company is facing winding
up proceedings does not prevent it from availing of the SOA provisions as it has
been observed that, ‘the whole point of s176 is to provide a statutory remedy to
sort out the problems of ailing companies without letting them go under’.171 In
any event, the court has held that the application for a RO need only be served on
creditors whose actions or proceedings were a subject of the RO to enable them
to oppose the application,172 but compliance with condition (d) would make this
ruling superfluous.
4.1.5.4. Scope of the restraints. Section 176(10) of the CA 1965 provided that the
court may restrain ‘further proceedings in any action or proceeding against the
company’. The only case in Malaysia which has ruled on this phrase, Re
Panglobal Bhd & Ors (Panglobal case),173 held that it referred to existing actions
or proceedings against the company, thus the application for the RO must be
served on those creditors where the RO has a restraining effect.174 However, ROs
in favour of the applicants have been granted by the courts on such terms as:
‘including but not limited to winding up, execution and arbitration proceed-
ings’;175 or ‘all legal proceedings’;176 or ‘pending actions or commencing new
actions’;177 or ‘all further action or further proceedings as well as any intended or




171Re Kuala Lumpur Industries Bhd (1990) 2 MLJ 180, 183. See also Intrakota
Komposit Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sogelease Advance (M) Sdn Bhd (2004) 8 CLJ 276, 296
for the view of the court that insolvency of the company does not preclude it from
utilising the provisions of the SOA.
172Re Panglobal Bhd & Ors (1999) 1 MLJ 590, 592.
173Ibid.
174Ibid 591–592.
175Re Kai Peng (2007) 8 MLJ 122, 126 [3–4].
176PECD Bhd & Anor v Merino-ODD Sdn Bhd & Ors (2009) 3 MLJ 362, 366 [2].
177YFG Berhad v Insanas Enterprise Sdn Bhd (2016) MLJU 664 [1].
178Re Foursea Construction (M) Sdn Bhd (1998) 4 MLJ 99, 101 & 103.
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or ‘any and all proceedings and/or actions and/or further proceedings in any suits
and/or proceedings and/or actions against each of the Applicants and/or in respect
of each of the Applicants and/or its assets and/or assets employed in its business,
including without limitation any winding-up, execution, arbitration proceedings,
act of repossession or purported repossession, the appointment of receivers and
managers, liquidators, provisional liquidators or otherwise whatsoever, by any
creditors and/or purported creditors or any other persons whatsoever’.179
In Singapore, the identical phrase, ‘further proceedings in any action or pro-
ceeding against the company’,180 for RO has been interpreted widely by its courts
which has been regarded as consistent with a ‘more practical approach’.181 The
courts were prepared to grant restraints which included a pre-emptive moratorium
on proceedings,182 or extend it to potential creditors or potential proceedings.183
Notwithstanding the rather restrictive nature of the decision on the scope of the
restraint in the Panglobal case,184 other courts in both Malaysia and Singapore are
quite robust and pragmatic in their approach as to the parameters of the RO. This
has led a judge, after a review of several decisions of the courts in Malaysia, to com-
ment that ‘the criteria for granting the orders are not based on uniform principles or
parameters. However the overriding consideration appears to be the justice of the
case and is not based solely on the strict guide lines stated in the said section’.185
4.1.6. The role of the courts
At first blush, the role of the court may look minimal given that it is involved in
two of the three stages of the SOA process, that is, at the first stage of the appli-
cant seeking leave to commence creditors’ meetings and at the third stage of sanc-
tioning the SOA after the creditors have given the requisite majority approval at
the second stage. After all, it has been observed judicially that the role of the court
is merely to act as a facilitator of the SOA process which is left to the creditors as
businessmen to negotiate and decide on whether to accept or reject the proposed
scheme.186 However, in the same breath, the court has reminded itself that the
entire SOA process is under its control in view of the requirement that the scheme
company has to refer to the court at every material stage of the process.187
179Ex parte High-5 Conglomerate Berhad & Anor and another case (2015) MLJU
444 [3].
180Section 210(10) of the SCA.
181Mohan Gopalan, ‘The Moratorium under Sections 210(10) and 211B of the
Companies Act’ (2019) SAL Prac 2, [19]. <https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.
sg/Journals/SAL-Practitioner/Insolvency-and-Restructuring/ctl/eFirstSALPDFJournalView/
mid/596/ArticleId/1345/Citation/JournalsOnlinePDF> accessed 17 August 2019.
182Ibid 19. See also Re TPC Korea Co Ltd (2010) 2 SLR 617, 620 [8].
183Ibid. See also Re Conchubar Aromatics Ltd and other matters (2015) SGHC
322 [18].
184(n 173).
185In Re Maxisegar Sdn Bhd (2010) 7 CLJ 1033, 1044–1045, per Hamid Sultan Abu
Backer J (as he then was).
186Intrakota Komposit Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sogelease Advance (M) Sdn Bhd (2004) 8
CLJ 276, 288. See also Wangsini Sdn Bhd v Grand United Holdings Bhd (1997) 5 CLJ
664, 674–675.
187Ibid 289.
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At the first stage of the SOA process where leave of court is sought for the
creditors’ meetings, the law empowers the summoning of the meeting in
accordance with the court’s direction.188 Save for that requirement, the SOA
framework, which has been described as ‘barebone’, does not provide any
guidelines other than leaving them to the court’s own discretion.189 Other than
deciding on the division of creditors into its proper classes on the principle of
dissimilar rights, the court is concerned with ensuring that the creditors affected
by the proposed SOA are able to be present in person or by proxy to consider
and vote in the court-ordered meetings.190 This will involve the court providing
directions as to the notice of meetings including the time, date and venue of the
meeting or meetings as well as proper and adequate disclosure of material
information to those creditors.191 Those directions are necessary since the court
must have control of the meetings as ordered by it.192 In addition, the court
would be mindful that the meetings should not be ordered if the SOA has no
prospect of being accepted by the creditors or is an abuse of process,193 where
the court may take into account matters of public policy including the issue of
commercial morality.194 At this stage, the court is often tasked with whether to
grant a RO on the application of the scheme company so as to facilitate the
SOA process.195
Having said that the second stage of the SOA process lies solely with the deci-
sions of the creditors at the court-ordered meetings, however it by no means
merely leave the court with nothing else to do except to rubber stamp the approval
of the creditors by sanctioning it at the third stage. At this third stage, the court is
concerned with a number of matters. First, the court must consider whether the
requirements of the law have been satisfied in that, the meetings for the creditors
or classes of creditors have been properly identified, convened and conducted as
ordered. It will not grant the sanction unless the proposal is bona fide as well as
fair and reasonable to the creditors. The court must also be satisfied that all
188Section 176(1) of the CA 1965.
189See text to n 135. See also Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 847; Jennifer Payne
(n 7) 19–20.
190Sham Chin Yen & Ors v Mansion Properties Sdn Bhd (2019) 1 LNS 781 [33]. See
also The Royal Bank of Scotland NV (formerly known as ABN Amro Bank NV) and
others v TT International Ltd and another appeal (2012) 2 SLR 213, 236.
191Ibid. See Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 848–849 on the list of procedural
components for the meetings to be directed by the court.
192Re Dee Valley Group plc (2017) 2 BCLC 328, 345.
193Intrakota Komposit Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sogelease Advance (M) Sdn Bhd (2004) 8
CLJ 276, 289; Twenty First Century Oils Sdn Bhd v Bank of Commerce (M) Bhd &
Ors (No. 2) (1993) 2 MLJ 353, 358.
194Ibid. See also Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd (1990) 2
MLJ 31, 35–36 where the court was prepared to consider objections by creditors even
at the first stage of the SOA application.
195Desa Samudra Sdn Bhd v Autoways Construction Sdn Bhd & 6 Ors (2009) 5 AMR
526, 532. An instance of a proposed SOA been held as against public policy was where
the scheme company proposed the distribution of trust moneys in its custody to its
creditors – see PECD Bhd & Anor v Merino-ODD Sdn Bhd & Ors (2009) 3 MLJ
362, 373.
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material information have been disclosed to the creditors and that the requisite
majority approval has been secured. To this end, the court will be concerned that
the views and interest of dissenting or non-voting creditors have received impar-
tial consideration.196 The court also takes a dim view of approving a SOA in
favour of a hopelessly insolvent company which it regards as being against public
policy to allow such a company to trade again.197 Finally, the court takes the sanc-
tion order seriously as once it is given, it has the effect of binding all creditors of
the scheme company including those who have dissented.198
Given that the SOA process is statutory based but without much procedural
guidelines, the courts’ involvement in the process as discussed above include hav-
ing to provide directions to the scheme companies to ensure that the creditors are
properly divided into classes and their court-ordered meetings are convened and
conducted with adequate disclosure of material information. Thus, the initiation,
implementation and supervision of the SOA process, that is, its entirety is exten-
sively handled by the court,199 and it is therefore not surprising that the SOA pro-
cess is labelled as court intensive.200
4.1.7. Retention of management
Another significant feature of the SOA process is that during the exercise, the
management of the company is retained with its powers intact.201
196Sham Chin Yen & Ors v Mansion Properties Sdn Bhd (2019) 1 LNS 781 [33]. In the
case of PB Securities Sdn Bhd v Autoways Holding Bhd (2000) 4 MLJ 417, 426–427, a
creditor included in the list for purposes of the RO application was subsequently
excluded from voting at the creditors’ meeting which the court viewed as an abuse of
process of court and thus rendered null and void the approval obtained at the creditors’
meeting. In the case of In re Sateras Resources (Malaysia) Bhd (2005) 6 CLJ 194,
204–212, the court opined that the creditors’ meeting convened earlier for the whole
group of creditors which resulted in the requisite majority approval was null and void
on the grounds of inadequate disclosure of information to the creditors and a failure to
convene meetings for the different classes of creditors.
197PECD Bhd & Anor v Merino-ODD Sdn Bhd & Ors (2009) 3 MLJ 362, 370;
Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd (1990) 2 MLJ 31, 35;
Re Buildmat (Australia) Ltd (1983) 7 ACLR 944, 947–948; Re Brian Cassidy Electrical
Industries Pty Ltd (1984) 9 ACLR 140, 142–143.
198Wangsini Sdn Bhd v Grand United Holdings Bhd (1997) 5 CLJ 664, 677. See also
Intrakota Komposit Sdn Bhd & Anor v Sogelease Advance (M) Sdn Bhd (2004) 8 CLJ
276, 286; Primus (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Rin Kei Mei & Ors (2012) 1 CLJ 176, 201.
199Primus (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Rin Kei Mei & Ors (2012) 1 CLJ 176, 201. See also
Hasani Mohd Ali, ‘Rescue options for financially distressed companies in Malaysia:
present regime and beyond’, (2009) 20(9) ICCLR 309, 314; Rabindra S Nathan,
Malaysia Overview, (2017), 2. <https://www.shearndelamore.com/pdfs/Law-Business-
Research-The-Asia-Pacific-Restructuring-Review-2017.pdf> accessed 18 August 2019.
200Anil Hargovan, ‘The source of efficacy for creditors’ schemes of arrangements in
England, Australia and Singapore’, (2010) 31(7) Company Lawyer 199, 201. See also
Bolanle Adebola, A Few Shades of Rescue: Towards an Understanding of the
Corporate Rescue Concept in England and Wales, 4. <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524488> accessed 18 August 2019.
201This feature of the SOA allows the directors to retain control of the company
without outsider involvement – Azmi and Abd Razak (n 1) 644. See text to n 214-215
and n 234 for a contrast with the CVA and JM.
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4.2. SOA under the CA 2016
The SOA process as appeared in the CA 1965 is replicated in the CA 2016 with
some changes,202 based on the recommendations of the CLRC. The more signifi-
cant changes are as follows:
1. Duration of RO
The CA 2016 limit the duration of the RO to an initial period of three months and
the total extension period to a period of nine months from the expiry of the initial
period,203 subject to the fulfilment of the same four conditions which appeared in
the CA 1965. This is consistent with the recommendations of the CLRC that there
‘must be finality in the moratorium period’.204
2. Scope of the RO
Based on the recommendations of the CLRC,205 the scope of the RO granted by the
court does not extend to any action or proceeding taken against the scheme company
by either the Registrar of Companies or the Securities Commission.206
3. Independent Assessment by an Approved Liquidator
The CLRC in its report expressed concern on behalf of the creditors of the scheme
company on the absence of any form of independent and professional assessment of
the proposed SOA.207 In line with those concern, it is now provided in the CA 2016
that the court may in the process of considering an SOA application, appoint an
approved liquidator to provide an independent and professional assessment of the
proposed scheme, as a form of safeguard for the creditors.208
This is achieved by having the assessment report tabled at the creditors’ meeting, as
an additional avenue of information on the viability of the proposed scheme to the
creditors.209
4. Removal of Headcount Test in Creditors’ Meeting
The two tier requirement for approval at creditors’ meeting under the CA 1965 was
comprised of: first, a majority of seventy-five per cent of the total value of the cred-
itors or class of creditors present and voting (the majority in value test), and sec-
ondly a majority of those creditors in number (the headcount test). The headcount
test was much criticised by Payne as rendering the SOA process a difficult one to
achieve.210 It has also been regarded as onerous for the scheme companies in
202Aishah Bidin and Nordin Hussin, ‘The New Law of Corporate Restructuring in
Malaysia: Analysis of the Concept of Scheme of Creditors’ Arrangements in Corporate
Insolvency Proceeding’ in Amit Kashyap (ed) Corporate Insolvency Law and
Bankruptcy Reforms in the Global Economy (IGI Global, 2019) 157.
203Section 368(2) of the CA 2016. See Bidin and Hussin (n 202) 157.
204CD No. 10 (n 4) 69 [4.10].
205Ibid.
206Section 368(6)(a) of the CA 2016. See Bidin and Hussin (n 202) 157.
207CD No. 10 (n 4) 68 [4.9].
208Section 367(1) of the CA 2016. See Bidin and Hussin (n 202) 157; Mohd Sulaiman
and Othman (n 36) 849.
209Section 367(2) of the CA 2016. See Bidin and Hussin (n 202) 157; Mohd Sulaiman
and Othman (n 36) 849.
210See text to n 132-133. Doubts have also been expressed as to the usefulness of the
headcount test for the original aim of protecting minority creditors when the SOA at
every stage is subject to judicial supervision – see Jo Windsor, ‘The ‘Headcount Test’
in Schemes of Arrangement post-Dee Valley’, (2017) 4 JIBFL 218, 218.
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attaining the requisite threshold.211 Under the CA 2016, the headcount test is no lon-
ger applicable and only the majority in value test remains.212
While under the CA 2016, the removal of the headcount test has made the
SOA process more friendly to the scheme company but other significant changes
to the law on SOA as enumerated above have been brought in to safeguard the
interests of the creditors,213 which will make it more onerous to the
scheme company.
5. The SOA and the corporate rescue mechanisms in Malaysia
This part considers whether the SOA still has a role in corporate rescue exercises
for private companies in Malaysia by comparing its features with that of the tai-
lor-made corporate rescue mechanisms under the CA 2016, the CVA and JM,
based on their salient features.
5.1. The SOA and CVA
5.1.1. Retention of management and IP
The CVA is the first of two corporate rescue mechanisms contained in the CA
2016. While the management of the company under the CVA is retained however
the proposal for a CVA is dependent on the opinion of an IP as to its reasonable
prospect of success and that sufficient funding is available for the exercise.214
The services of an IP is also required for the CVA implementation.215 Similarly,
in the case of SOA, the management of the scheme company is maintained but
the scheme is less dependent on the active participation of the IP except where the
court during the SOA application opined that an approved liquidator needs to be
appointed to provide an independent and professional assessment of the pro-
posed scheme.216
5.1.2. Court involvement
The CVA is less court intensive than a SOA,217 where in the latter the involve-
ment of the court is significant in ordering the creditors’ meeting or classes of
creditors’ meeting; scrutinising the scheme proposal and outcome of the meetings
of creditors; and sanctioning the proposed scheme.218 The court is also empow-
ered to grant a RO which amounts to a moratorium which is a common feature of
a corporate rescue mechanism, but any such order is not automatic and is subject
to the discretion of the court.
211Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 851.
212Section 366(3) of the CA 2016.
213Lee Shih, ‘The Companies Act 2016: Key Changes and Challenges’, (2017) 44(1)
JMCL 21, 27.
214Section 397 of the CA 2016.
215Section 401 of the CA 2016.
216See text to n 208–209. See also Payne (n 7) 212.
217Lee Shih, ‘The Scheme of Arrangement and Corporate Rescue Framework in
Malaysia’, (2019) 1st Quarter INSOL World 17, 17.
218See text to n 187–196.
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5.1.3. Moratorium
It has been noted that with the pre-requirement conditions for a RO under the CA
2016 and the string of cases which held that those pre-requirement conditions
must be satisfied before a RO can be given,219 the scheme companies will
encounter difficulties in getting its creditors not to object to the application to the
court for a RO. In contrast, the moratorium for CVA applies automatically once
the documents as required under the CA 2016 are filed in court.220 However
the duration and extension of the moratorium for a CVA is first limited to 28 days
and then extended for not more than 60 days from the consent of the creditors
obtained at its meeting,221 which is shorter than the period of a RO in the SOA
which is for an initial period of not more than 3months with an extension by the
court for not more than 9months.222 Unlike the RO, the effects of the moratorium
is extensively spelt out with certainty in the CA 2016 rather than left to the discre-
tion of the court for the RO.223
5.1.4. Publicity
Unlike the SOA where the RO is granted by the court, the CVA at the time when
the moratorium is in force, the Act requires the company to place the name of the
IP nominee and the fact of the moratorium in its business documents including
letters, orders and invoices, website, negotiable instruments, thus announcing to
the world of its financial predicament including its business partners.224
5.1.5. Limitation on availability
The CVA has a drawback as compared to the SOA in that it is not available to a
public company, a licensed institution under the laws enforced by the Central Bank
of Malaysia, a company which is subject to the Capital Markets and Services Act
2007, and a company which creates a charge over its property or any of its under-
taking.225 Those limitations would mean that the CVA is not available to a private
company which has obtained financing from a secured creditor having a security
either as a charge over its property or a debenture which will include a charge over
its undertaking.226 In contrast, the SOA is able to bind secured creditors.
5.1.6. Classification of creditors
One of the major limitation for the SOA is that it has to contend with the legal
need for classification of creditors. On the other hand, for the CVA there is no
such need of creditors’ classification.227
219See text to n 154–172.
220Section 398(1) of the CA 2016.
221Section 398(2) and the Eight Schedule [3] of the CA 2016.
222Section 368(2) of the CA 2016.
223Section 398(2) and the Eight Schedule [17] of the CA 2016.
224Section 398(2) and the Eight Schedule [18] of the CA 2016.
225Section 395 of the CA 2016.
226It was noted in Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 922–923 that in Malaysia,
financial institutions, would more often than not, require even private companies in
seeking loans to provide securities in the form of a charge over its property or
undertakings.
227Payne (n 7) 206.
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5.1.7. Guidelines for creditors’ meeting
The result of the creditors’ meetings in both the CVA and the SOA are crucial
elements in its success and for the CVA, rules of meetings are provided in the CA
2016,228 but in the case of the SOA, the CA 2016, like its predecessor the CA
1965, is still bereft of any guidelines and left to each court to give directions on
the conduct of the meetings in the case before it.
5.1.8. Flexibility and binding effect
A CVA can only involve the company’s unsecured creditors whereas a SOA can
accommodate both unsecured and secured creditors but into different classes. The
SOA can even be granted by the court involving only one class of unsecured cred-
itors such as the house purchasers of a housing development project in the case of
Dataran Mantin case,229 with the exclusion of the scheme company’s other
unsecured creditors such as its suppliers, an example of the flexibility in SOA.
However, the CVA only binds those creditors who were entitled to notice of the
meeting and to vote unlike the SOA when approved is binding on all creditors.230
5.1.9. Finality of corporate rescue
The SOA, subject to grounds of fraud in obtaining the creditors’ approval, offers
finality once the court sanctions the scheme which is then registered with the
ROC.231 The CVA is implemented in accordance with such terms as contained in
the requisite approval of the creditors. However the CA 2016 does not provide
any avenue to challenge the arrangement although there is a provision which only
permits the conduct of the supervisor, who is usually the IP nominee, to be chal-
lenged.232 Since the implementation of the arrangement is under the supervision
of the supervisor/nominee, the possibility of his acts or decisions remain open to
challenge by any of the company’s creditors or any person who is dissatisfied
with it.
5.2. The SOA and JM
5.2.1. Retention of management and IP
The second corporate rescue mechanism introduced by the CA 2016 is the JM
which is adopted from the Singapore JM version.233 For the JM, the management
of the company is displaced by an IP, known as a judicial manager (JMgr) who is
empowered by the court to take charge of the affairs, business and property of the
228Section 399 of the CA 2016.
229See (n 83) and text to n 110–112.
230Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell
2005), 28.
231Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 829. See also Choong Kim Meng & Anor v
Arena Kencana Sdn Bhd & Ors (Goh Hok Huat, intervener) (2016) MLJU 604 [47
(c)]; The Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Reliance National Asia Re Pte Ltd (2008) 3 SLR
121, 165. The relevant provision in the CA 2016 is section 366(3), (4) & (5). The
finality and binding nature of the SOA allows third parties to confidently deal with the
scheme company such as to provide financing to it – see Kamuja Corporation Sdn Bhd
v Aras Dimensi Sdn Bhd (Dalam Liquidasi) (2016) 2 AMCR 532, 541.
232Section 401(4) of the CA 2016.
233Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 876.
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company.234 In contrast with the situation for SOA, the management of the com-
pany is retained.
5.2.2. Court involvement
The SOA process is court intensive with the involvement of the court in key areas
on whether to: order a meeting of creditors, grant a RO on the application of the
scheme company, to sanction the proposed scheme after the requisite approval
has been secured at the creditors’ meeting. Whereas in JM, the court’s role is to
consider whether a JM order is to be granted on an application by a company or
its directors or a creditor.235 If the JM order is granted then the affairs, business
and property of the company will be under the hands of a judicial manager
(JMgr) who will displace its management.236 The duration of the JM order is for
6months which may be extended for another 6months,237 who will prepare pro-
posals for the creditors’ approval and then report its outcome to the court and give
notice of it to the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) or such other par-
ties as ordered by the court.238
5.2.3. Moratorium
Unlike the SOA where a moratorium-like RO is only granted on an application to
the court and subject to the court’s discretion, the hallmark of a corporate rescue
mechanism is the availability of the moratorium on an automatic basis, in this
case, the JM on the granting by the court of a JM order.239 The scope of the mora-
torium is more extensively spelt out in the Act as compared to that for the RO.
5.2.4. Publicity
Where a JM order is granted which result in an automatic moratorium and the
appointment of a JMgr, the Act requires that notification of the JM order and the
JMgr’s position is given in its website, all documents including invoice, order for
goods and services, letters.240 In contrast, when a RO is granted for a SOA, there
is no statutory need for such notification.
5.2.5. Limitation on its availability
Unlike the SOA, the JM is not available to a licensed institution under the laws
enforced by the Central Bank of Malaysia, and a company which is subject to the
Capital Markets and Services Act 2007.241 Another significant limitation is that
the application for a JM order can be vetoed by a secured creditor.242
234Ibid 875.
235Section 405 of the CA 2016.
236Sections 405(3) and 414(2) of the CA 2016.
237Sections 405(3) and 414(2) of the CA 2016.
238Sections 420 and 421 of the CA 2016.
239Section 411 of the CA 2016.
240Section 412 of the CA 2016.
241Section 403 of the CA 2016.
242Section 409 of the CA 2016.
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5.2.6. Classification of creditors
In contrast to the JM, a significant feature of the SOA is the requirement to segre-
gate its creditors into classes. For the JM, all creditors are considered in
one group.243
5.2.7. Guidelines for creditors’ meeting
In both the JM and the SOA, the creditors’ approval play a significant role in the
success of the rescue exercise. For the JM, a set of rules governing the creditors’
meetings such as the notice of meeting, chairman of meeting, proof of debts, quo-
rum and filing of the result of meeting are contained in the Companies (Corporate
Rescue Mechanism) Rules 2018. As for the SOA, there is a lack of such rules or
guidelines in its framework which is left to the decision of each court.
5.2.8. Flexibility
The JM process may be derailed by a secured creditor because of its veto
power,244 but the SOA has no such limitation. In addition, the SOA may even be
granted by the court in favour of one class of unsecured creditors, which offers
flexibility in its employment for corporate rescue purposes.
5.2.9. Finality of corporate rescue
Finality in the SOA process, save for grounds of fraud in obtaining the creditors’
approval, is achieved once the court sanctions the scheme which is then registered
with the CCM.245 In the case of a JM order it may still be challenged by a creditor
where the order was obtained ex parte without full disclosure of material facts or
obtained mala fide or defective on other substantial grounds so as to invoke the
inherent jurisdiction of the court,246 even though it does not fall within the four
situations in the CA 2016 for the discharging of the order.247
243Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 917.
244Section 409 of the CA 2016 and its amendment in Companies (Amendment) Act
2019 [Act A1605] gazetted on 9th October 2019. See also Leadmont Development Sdn
Bhd v Infra Segi Sdn Bhd (2018) 10 CLJ 412, 420.
245Mohd Sulaiman and Othman (n 36) 829. See also Choong Kim Meng & Anor v
Arena Kencana Sdn Bhd & Ors (Goh Hok Huat, intervener) (2016) MLJU 604 [47(c)]
which has cited the Singapore case of The Oriental Insurance Co Ltd v Reliance
National Asia Re Pte Ltd (2008) 3 SLR 121, 165. The relevant provision in the CA
2016 is section 366(3), (4) & (5). The finality and binding nature of the SOA enables
third parties to confidently deal with the scheme company such as to provide financing
to it – see Kamuja Corporation Sdn Bhd v Aras Dimensi Sdn Bhd (Dalam Liquidasi)
(2016) 2 AMCR 532, 541.
246Leadmont Development Sdn Bhd v Infra Segi Sdn Bhd & another case (2018) 10
CLJ 412, 426.
247Ibid, 422. See also the relevant provisions of the CA 2016 which refer to the four
situations where the JM order can be discharged, that is, sections 421(5) or 424(1) &
(2)(a) [where the purpose of the JM order has not been achieved] or 424(10 & (2)(a)
[where the purpose of the JM order is incapable of achievement] or 425(1)(a) &
425(3)(d) of the CA 2016. Note that a fifth situation is covered by section 425(1)(b)
& 425(3)(d).
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6. Conclusion
The SOA has been utilised by public companies rather than for private compa-
nies in Malaysia for restructuring purposes. Hence, the lack of any rescue proce-
dures, in general, had led to the introduction of two rescue mechanisms, in
particular, the CVA which is exclusively meant for private companies. This
paper addresses the question as to whether the SOA may be utilised as a mech-
anism for the rescue of a financially distressed private company despite the pres-
ence of two specially designed corporate rescue mechanisms, the CVA and JM.
In this regard, a comparison was made on the features of the SOA, first with
that of the CVA followed by those in the JM noting the statutory limitation that
the CVA is only applicable to a private company which does not have a secured
creditor and in the case of the JM, a secured creditor is able to veto the applica-
tion for a JM order.
In the case of a financially distressed private company with even a single
secured creditor, the law prohibits that company from having recourse to both cor-
porate rescue mechanisms. Under such circumstances, the SOA is the only option
left under the CA 2016 which may operate as a corporate rescue tool for
the company.
The SOA is flexible enough as a rescue mechanism for private companies to
accommodate a compromise even though it is made with only one class of
unsecured creditors. This feature is unique to the SOA, and is unavailable in both
the CVA and JM since both mechanisms have to include all unsecured creditors.
As for the complex issue of classification of creditors in SOA, it is contended
that a private company will often only have to deal with two types of creditors,
namely, the unsecured creditors in one class and the secured creditors in another
class which should not be controversial. Thus, such a company will not face
much issue in the classification exercise in contrast to that of a public company,
for instance, in the case of Transmile Group Bhd where contentions were raised
as to whether its creditors such as holders of medium term notes which were con-
stituted under a trust deed should have different rights from lenders under syndi-
cated loan agreement and holders of convertible bonds, financial securities which
are common to public companies.248 The Court of Appeal in dealing with such
issues had to scrutinise the terms of those contractual documents as to the parties’
rights.249 This classification exercise was a concern for the CLRC in the use of
the SOA as a corporate rescue tool which led to its recommendations for the cor-
porate rescue mechanisms to be introduced.250
Under those circumstances, this paper argues that the SOA with its flexibility,
its ability to tie up all creditors including the secured creditors with the requisite
approval, its moratorium-like RO and the unlikelihood of any issue with the clas-
sification exercise, may be a viable option as a corporate rescue tool. However,
there is still concern for certain drawbacks in the SOA that have been identified in
this paper and that have not been addressed which may affect its usefulness.
248Malaysian Trustees Bhd v Transmile Group Bhd & Ors (2012) 3 MLJ 679.
249Ibid 690–692.
250CD No. 10 (n 4) 34 [2.14].
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It is noted that a number of cases have concluded that in an application for
the moratorium-like RO by a scheme company, certain pre-required RO con-
ditions are needed to be satisfied before the court will give its consideration.
The most challenging condition is for the scheme company to disclose its
intention to apply for the RO to its creditors with the objective of seeking
their approval of a nominee to act as a director of the scheme company,251
which may trigger off alarm bells to the creditors to commence proceedings or
actions against the scheme company, thus defeating the purpose of having a RO.252
A suggested solution may be to introduce a short term automatic moratorium on the
filing of a SOA. After all, the CLRC had acknowledged that a corporate rescue sys-
tem for Malaysia should include a feature which provides for moratorium,253 more
so in circumstances where the SOA may be the only viable rescue option for a
financially distressed private company. In contrast where both corporate rescue
mechanisms are applicable, the automatic moratorium is available for the CVA, and
the JM.
Another significant drawback as identified in this paper is the framework of
the SOA which has been described as ‘barebone’. In this regard, this view is forti-
fied by the recognition in Singapore of this deficiency.254 Therefore, the uncer-
tainties associated with this drawback may result in additional costs and time
spent on the SOA process since there is no guidelines or regulations to govern
matters such as disputes as to the conduct of creditors’ meetings, powers of the
chairman and adjudication on the proof of debts.
Finally, it is noted that a financially distressed private company seeking a
reprieve in the use of SOA may be hampered by the costs, complexity and length
of time taken due to the intensive involvement of the court.255 The remedy for that
include the streamlining of certain procedures especially those pertaining to cred-
itors’ meetings and the introduction of a short term automatic moratorium as sug-
gested earlier. The consensus on those factors as to costs, complexity and time
consumption in affecting the SOA have been observed by both academics and non-
academics such as legal practitioners in the jurisdictions of the UK,256 Australia,257
251Section 368(2)(d) of the CA 2016.
252The purpose of a RO in SOA is to afford protection to the scheme companies and its
assets from pending suits filed by its creditors by restraining those proceedings
including winding up except with leave of court, while it is engaged in the process of
formulating and effecting a SOA for the benefit of its creditors.
253CD No. 10 (n 4) 25 [1.7 (iii)].
254See text to n 134–138.
255Azmi and Abd Razak (n 1) 645. See also Cork Report (n 6) 415; Payne (n 7) 188.
256Hugh Lyons and John Tillman, ‘Fair Treatment in insolvency compromises’ (2007) 7
JIBFL 477. See also Payne (n 7) 188 footnote 51; Goode (n 230) 28; O’Dea, et al (n
109) 5; Christian Pilkington, Schemes of Arrangement in Corporate Structuring (Sweet
& Maxwell, 2013) 11.
257Harris (n 62) 73–74. See also James O’Donovan, Company Administrators and
Scheme Managers (Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited, 2012) 657;
Dominic Emmett, Peter Bowden and Anna Ryan, Chapter 2 – Australia in The
Restructuring Review (12th ed. 2019) 11, 17; Mighty River International Ltd v Hughes
(2017) WASCA 152 [13–114].
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and Singapore,258 with laws having close similarities to that in Malaysia. Likewise,
the same opinion is shared in Malaysia.259
In conclusion, this paper argues that the SOA may be a viable corporate rescue
tool for financially distressed private companies especially where the CVA and
JM are not applicable. In addition, it may in spite of the availability of those two
corporate rescue mechanisms be a useful addition to the arsenal of corporate res-
cue tools if certain enhancements as enumerated above were to be introduced into
the SOA law.
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